Fiscal Capacity and Executive Constraints in Early Modern Europe

Henriques, António, Kivanc Karaman and Nuno Palma

No 20132, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: According to the prevailing view of Europe’s political history, constrained government and state capacity developed in tandem. In this study, we reevaluate this perspective by constructing new historical indices for executive constraints and fiscal capacity. Our find-ings challenge the presumed connection, illustrating that high-capacity states existed un-der unconstrained government, and low-capacity states existed under constrained re-gimes. We also identify what made England historically distinctive: its political system stood out for combining constrained government with high fiscal capacity. This rare com-bination helps explain the eventual take-off of modern economic growth in England.

Keywords: Executive constraints; State capacity; Government efficiency; Checks and balances; Historical political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 N13 O10 O23 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
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