Youth Employment Policies In France
Denis Fougere (),
Francis Kramarz () and
Thierry Magnac ()
No 2394, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
In this paper, we present a summary of recent microeconometric results on the evaluation of the effects of active labour market policies on youth employment in France. We focus our discussion on three types of policies: (1) youth employment schemes for out-of-employment and low-skilled young adults, (2) on-the-job training schemes, (3) payroll tax subsidies for minimum wage workers. Training programs for unemployed young workers have in general no effects on post-training wages or employment probabilities, except if they have a large training content. In contrast, the reduction of labour costs has significant effects on employment probabilities of low-wage workers; however their effects appear to be stronger for workers between 25 and 30.
Keywords: Evaluation Methodology; Minimum Wage; Training Programs; Youth Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 C41 J38 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Youth employment policies in France (2000)
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