Shopping Hours and Price Competition

Andreas Irmen and Roman Inderst

No 3001, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper develops an argument explaining why retail prices may rise in response to the deregulation of opening hours. We make this point in a model of imperfect duopolistic competition. In a deregulated market retailers view the choice of opening hours as a means to increase the degree of perceived product differentiation thus relaxing price competition. If the opportunity costs of the time spent on shopping are sufficiently high the equilibrium configuration has asymmetric shopping hours where one retailer stays open for longer than the other does. Both retailers charge higher prices than under regulation, and both are strictly better off.

Keywords: Deregulation; Multi-dimensional product differentiation; Opening hours; Retailing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L51 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Shopping hours and price competition (2005)
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