The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment

Jan van Ours, Zweimüller, Josef and Rafael Lalive
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Josef Zweimüller ()

No 3311, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labour market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter the duration of unemployment. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Keywords: Unemployment duration; Benefit sanctions; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effect Of Benefit Sanctions On The Duration Of Unemployment (2005)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
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