The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment

Rafael Lalive, Jan van Ours and Josef Zweimüller ()

No 469, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Keywords: benefit sanctions; unemployment duration; monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2002-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

Published - published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, 3 (6), 1386-1417

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effect Of Benefit Sanctions On The Duration Of Unemployment (2005)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
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