The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment

Rafael Lalive, Jan van Ours and Josef Zweimüller ()

No 469, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Keywords: benefit sanctions; unemployment duration; monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2002-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

Published - published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, 3 (6), 1386-1417

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effect Of Benefit Sanctions On The Duration Of Unemployment (2005)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
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