Feasible Globalizations

Dani Rodrik

No 3524, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The nation-state system, democratic politics, and full economic integration are mutually incompatible. Of the three, at most two can be had together. The Bretton Woods/GATT regime was successful because its architects subjugated international economic integration to the needs and demands of national economic management and democratic politics. A renewed ?Bretton-Woods compromise? would preserve some limits on integration, while crafting better global rules to handle the integration that can be achieved. Among ?feasible globalizations,? the most promising is a multilaterally negotiated visa scheme that allows expanded (but temporary) entry into the advanced nations of a mix of skilled and unskilled workers from developing nations. Such a scheme would likely create income gains that are larger than all of the items on the WTO negotiating agenda taken together, even if it resulted in a relatively small increase in cross-border labor flows.

Keywords: Globalization; International institutions; International labour mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
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