Feasible Globalizations

Rodrik, Dani

Feasible Globalizations

No 9129, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The nation-state system, democratic politics, and full economic integration are mutually incompatible. Of the three, at most two can be had together. The Bretton Woods/GATT regime was successful because its architects subjugated international economic integration to the needs and demands of national economic management and democratic politics. A renewed 'Bretton-Woods compromise' would preserve some limits on integration, while crafting better global rules to handle the integration that can be achieved. Among 'feasible glablization,' the most promising is a multilaterally negotiated visa scheme that allows expanded (but temporary) entry into the advanced nations of a mix of skilled and unskilled workers from developing nations. Such a scheme would likely create income gains that are larger than all of the items on the WTO negotiating agenda taken together, even if it resulted in a relatively small increase in cross-border labor flows.

JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-08
Note: IFM ITI
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

Published as Della Giusta, Marina, Uma S. Kambhampati, and Robert Hunter Wade (eds.) Critical Perspectives on Globalization, Globalization of the World Economy series, vol. 17. An Elgar Reference Collection. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2006.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9129.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Feasible Globalizations (2002)
Working Paper: Feasible Globalizations (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9129

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9129

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().