Information, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Nuno Garoupa and Mohamed Jellal ()

No 3560, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our Paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence).

Keywords: Fine; Probability of detection and punishment; Corruption; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3560 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information corruption and optimal law enforcement (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3560

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3560

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().