Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game

Massimo Motta () and Helder Vasconcelos

No 4175, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper models a sequential merger formation game with endogenous efficiency gains in which every merger has to be submitted for approval to the Antitrust Authority (AA). Two different types of AA are studied: first, a myopic AA, which judges a given merger without considering that subsequent mergers may occur; and, second, a forward-looking AA, which anticipates the ultimate market structure a given merger will lead to. By contrasting the decisions of these two types of AA, merger policy implications can be drawn. In particular, the efficiency offence argument does not find any justification under a forward-looking AA.

Keywords: Endogenous mergers; Foresight; Efficiency offence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game (2005)
Working Paper: Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game (2003)
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