Money Illusion and Coordination Failure

Ernst Fehr and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 4283, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent pay-offs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing pay-offs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players? behaviour is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails.

Keywords: Money illusion; Coordination failure; Equilibrium selection; Multiple equilibria; Coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 E32 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Money illusion and coordination failure (2007)
Working Paper: Money Illusion and Coordination Failure (2004)
Working Paper: Money Illusion and Coordination Failure (2004)
Working Paper: Money illusion and coordination failure (2004)
Working Paper: Money Illusion and Coordination Failure
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