Can Private Giving Promote Economic Segregation?

Kimberley Scharf, Ignatius Horstmann and Al Slivinski ()

No 4354, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and locational equilibria. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, may promote economic segregation rather than integration. In such a scenario, a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be Pareto-improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority-supported federal tax constitution.

Keywords: Private provision of public goods; Jurisdiction formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Can private giving promote economic segregation? (2007)
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