Can Private Giving Promote Economic Segregation?

Kimberley Scharf, Ignatius Horstmann and Al Slivinski ()

No 4354, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and locational equilibria. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, may promote economic segregation rather than integration. In such a scenario, a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be Pareto-improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority-supported federal tax constitution.

Keywords: Private provision of public goods; Jurisdiction formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4354 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Can private giving promote economic segregation? (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4354

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4354

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().