Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

Gerd Muehlheusser and Andreas Roider

No 5308, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ('black sheep') exhibit behaviour disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehaviour to the authorities (they set up a 'wall of silence'). Much cited examples include hospitals and police departments. In this paper, these features arise in equilibrium. An important ingredient of our model are benefits that agents receive when cooperating with each other in a team. Our results suggest that teams in which the importance of these benefits varies across team members are especially prone to the above mentioned phenomenon.

Keywords: Teams; Misbehaviour; Wall of silence; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10
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Related works:
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2005)
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2005)
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2004)
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2004)
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