Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

Gerd Muehlheusser () and Andreas Roider
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Gerd Muehlheusser: University of Hamburg

No 1171, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited examples include hospitals and police departments. In this paper, these features arise in equilibrium. An important ingredient of our model are benefits that agents receive when cooperating with each other in a team. Our results suggest that asymmetric teams where these benefits vary

Keywords: asymmetric information; teams; misbehavior; wall of silence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
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Published - revised version published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 65 (3-4), 387-408

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https://docs.iza.org/dp1171.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2005)
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2005)
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2005)
Working Paper: Black Sheep and Walls of Silence (2004)
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