Information in Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann and Välimäki, Juuso
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juuso Välimäki

No 5494, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We specifically consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information. Second, we argue that in the presence of endogenous information, the robustness of the mechanism to the type space and higher order beliefs becomes a natural desideratum. We discuss recent approaches to robust mechanism design and robust implementation.

Keywords: Information; Acquisition; Mechanism; Design; Robust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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Working Paper: Information in Mechanism Design (2006)
Working Paper: Information in Mechanism Design (2005)
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