Information in Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

No 1532, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but related aspects of information management important in many design settings. We review the existing literature and point out directions for additional future work.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Information Acquisition; Ex Post Equilibrium; Robust Mechanism Design; Interdependent Values; Information Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp and nep-ict
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Blundell, Newey and Persson, eds., Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, 2006, pp. 186-221

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Related works:
Working Paper: Information in Mechanism Design (2006)
Working Paper: Information in Mechanism Design (2006)
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