Competition and Well-Being

Frans van Winden (), Jordi Brandts and Arno Riedl

No 5532, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies the effects of competition in an environment where people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that, in comparison with no competition, the presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any gains in earnings for the short side of the exchange relation. Moreover, competition has a clearly negative impact on the disposition towards others and on the experienced well-being of those on the long side. Since subjective well-being improves only for those on the short side competition contributes to larger inequalities in experienced well-being. All in all competition does not show up as a positive force in our environment.

Keywords: Competition; Happiness; Well-being; Laboratory experiment; Emotions; Market interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C92 D30 J50 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ltv and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition and Well-Being (2015)
Working Paper: Competition and Well-Being (2005)
Working Paper: Competition and well-being (2005)
Working Paper: Competition and Well-Being (2004)
Working Paper: Competition and Well-Being (2004)
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