Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment
Ramon Marimon and
Vincenzo Quadrini ()
No 5840, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We study how barriers to competition - such as, restrictions to business start-up and strict enforcement of covenants or IPR - affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. These barriers lower the competition for human capital and reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. We show in a dynamic general equilibrium model that this mechanism has the potential to account for significant cross-country income inequality.
Keywords: Contract enforcement; Human capital; Economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-dev, nep-dge, nep-ent and nep-hrm
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Working Paper: Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment (2006)
Working Paper: Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment (2005)
Working Paper: Competition, innovation and growth with limited commitment (2005)
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