Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment
Ramon Marimon and
Vincenzo Quadrini ()
No 12474, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
We study how barriers to competition---such as restrictions to business start-up and strict enforcement of covenants or IPR---affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. These barriers lower the competition for human capital and reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. We show in a dynamic general equilibrium model that this mechanism has the potential to account for significant cross-country income inequality.
JEL-codes: L14 L16 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-dev, nep-dge, nep-ent, nep-ino and nep-knm
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Working Paper: Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment (2006)
Working Paper: Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment (2005)
Working Paper: Competition, innovation and growth with limited commitment (2005)
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