Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

Nauro Campos and Francesco Giovannoni

No 5886, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries.

Keywords: Lobbying; Corruption; Transition; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E23 H26 O17 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-mac, nep-pbe, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5886 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying, corruption and political influence (2007)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence (2006)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5886

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP5886

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().