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Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

Nauro Campos () and Francesco Giovannoni

No 2313, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries.

Keywords: lobbying; institutions; transition; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E23 D72 H26 O17 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pbe, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in: Public Choice, 2007, 131 (1), 1-21

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Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying, corruption and political influence (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence (2006) Downloads
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