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Pricing and Trust

Jean-Robert Tyran, Steffen Huck and Gabriele K. Ruchala

No 6135, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. The effect in monopolies is more or less in line with standard intuition. As price falls volume increases and so does quality, such that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. However, quite in contrast to standard intuition, we also observe an efficiency rise in response to regulation in oligopolies. Both, transaction volume and traded quality are, in fact, maximal in regulated oligopolies.

Keywords: Experience goods; Markets; Moral hazard; Price competition; Reputation; Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D40 D80 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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