Framing Effects in Political Decision Making: Evidence From a Natural Voting Experiment

Monika Bütler () and Maréchal, Michel André
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michel André Maréchal

No 6200, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper analyzes a recent ballot in which two virtually identical popular initiatives, both demanding a decrease in the legal age of retirement in Switzerland, led to differences in approval rates of nearly seven percentage points. Based on this unique natural experiment, the existence of emphasis framing effects is tested for and their determinants are identified outside of the controlled settings of laboratories. Nonetheless, the analyzed setting allows for considerably more control than usually available in the field: All party, government and interest group recommendations were symmetric for both initiatives, and the simultaneous vote rules out potential variation of individual preferences and compositional changes of the electorate over time. Using community and individual level data it is shown that the difference in approval rates is largely due to the different emphases in the initiatives' titles.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; Direct democracy; Framing effect; Natural experiment; Pension reform; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D72 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Framing Effects in Political Decision Making: Evidence from a Natural Voting Experiment (2007)
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