Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone

Luis Garicano, Tano Santos and Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde

No 9404, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the Euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. We show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration, in turn, not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions, prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident. We analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal and, by way of contrast, in Germany, a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the Euro.

Keywords: Bubbles; Euro crisis; Financial crisis; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E0 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (162)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Eurozone (2013)
Working Paper: Political credit cycles: the case of the Euro zone (2013)
Working Paper: Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone (2013)
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