Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone

Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Luis Garicano and Tano Santos

No 18899, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the Euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. We show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration, in turn, not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions, prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident. We analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal and, by way of contrast, in Germany, a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the Euro.

JEL-codes: D72 E0 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-his and nep-opm
Note: EFG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (162)

Published as Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2013. "Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Eurozone," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 145-66, Summer.

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Journal Article: Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Eurozone (2013)
Working Paper: Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone (2013)
Working Paper: Political credit cycles: the case of the Euro zone (2013)
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