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Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects

Federico Ciliberto (), Amalia Miller (), Helena Nielsen () and Marianne Simonsen ()

No 9429, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register-based data on fertile-aged women working in medium sized establishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low-education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.

Keywords: career-family conflict; Fertility; multiple equilibria; peer effects; workplace interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: PLAYING THE FERTILITY GAME AT WORK: AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF PEER EFFECTS (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects (2013) Downloads
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