Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings

Dipjyoti Majumdar

No 5001, Working Papers from Concordia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study incentive issues related to two-sided one-to-one stable matching problem after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthtelling is required to maximize the expected utility of every agent, expected utility being that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that when preferences are unrestricted there exists no matching procedure that is both stable and OBIC. Next preferences are restricted to the case where remaining single is the worst alternative for every agent. We show that in this case, if agents matching procedures that are both stable and OBIC even with restricted preferences.

Keywords: stable matching; incentives; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2003-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crd:wpaper:05001

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