Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching

Dipjyoti Majumdar

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study incentive issues related to the two-sided one-to-one stable matching problem after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthtelling is required to maximize expected utility of every agent, expected utility being computed with respect to the agent's prior and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that when preferences are unrestricted there exists no matching procedure that is both stable and OBIC. Next preferences are restricted to the case where remaining single is the worst alternative for every agent. We show that in this case, if agents have uniform priors the stable matching generated by the "deferred acceptance algorithms" are OBIC. However, for generic priors there are no procedures that are both stable and OBIC even with restricted preferences.

Keywords: Stable matching; Incentives; Strategy-proofness; Marriage stable; Incitation; Manipulabilité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242988
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings (2003)
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