Communication and Binary Decision: Is it Better to Communicate ?

Frédéric Loss (), Estelle Malavolti and Thibaud Vergé
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Estelle Malavolti: ENAC (LEEA)

No 2013-50, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We study information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision-maker when the decision is binary and the expert does not have a systematic bias. Whenever, an equilibrium exists where the decision is delegated to the expert, it is ex-ante Pareto-dominant. Adding a round of multilateral communication does not improve information transmission. The decision-maker can however improve information transmission by communicating sequentially with two experts. However, introduce multiple rounds of communication (i.e., allowing for rebuttal) does not help

JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2013-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate? (2013)
Working Paper: Communication and binary decisions: is it better to communicate ? (2013)
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