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Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?

Frédéric Loss (), Estelle Malavolti and Thibaud Vergé

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2013, vol. 169, issue 3, 451-467

Abstract: We study information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision-maker when the decision is binary and the expert does not have a systematic bias. Whenever an equilibrium exists where the decision is delegated to the expert, it is ex ante Pareto-dominant. Adding a round of multilateral communication does not improve information transmission. The decision-maker can, however, improve information transmission by communicating sequentially with two experts. However, introducing multiple rounds of communication (i.e., allowing for rebuttal) does not help.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Communication and Binary Decision: Is it Better to Communicate ? (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Communication and binary decisions: is it better to communicate ? (2013)
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DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13621221166330

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