Communication and binary decisions: is it better to communicate ?

Frédéric Loss (), Estelle Malavolti () and Thibaud Vergé
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Estelle Malavolti: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile
Thibaud Vergé: Competition Authority - Competition Authority

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Abstract: We study information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision-maker when the decision is binary and the expert does not have a systematic bias. Whenever an equilibrium exists where the decision is delegated to the expert, it is ex ante Pareto-dominant. Adding a round of multilateral communication does not improve information transmission. The decision-maker can, however, improve information transmission by communicating sequentially with two experts. However, introducing multiple rounds of communication (i.e., allowing for rebuttal) does not help.

Keywords: communication; delegation; experts; information transmission; cheap-talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2013, 169 (3), pp 451-467. ⟨10.1628/093245613X13621221166330⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate? (2013)
Working Paper: Communication and Binary Decision: Is it Better to Communicate ? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00874852

DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13621221166330

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