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Fighting Mobile Crime

Rosario Crino (), Giovanni Immordino and Salvatore Piccolo ()

No def071, DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE)

Abstract: We develop a model in which two countries choose their enforcement levels non- cooperatively, in order to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. We assume that crime is mobile, both ex ante (migration) and ex post (eeing), and that criminals who hide abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited back. We show that, when extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement compared to the cooperative outcome: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. By contrast, when extradition is sufficiently costly, a large enforcement may induce criminals to ee the country in which they have perpetrated a crime. Surprisingly, the fear of extraditing criminals enables countries to coordinate on the efficient (cooperative) outcome.

Keywords: Crime; Enforcement; Extradition; Fleeing; Migration. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm, nep-law, nep-mig and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def071.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2018) Downloads
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