Fighting Mobile Crime

Rosario Crino (), Giovanni Immordino, Gülen Karakoç-Palminteri and Salvatore Piccolo ()
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Gülen Karakoç-Palminteri: Università di Milano Bicocca

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We develop a model in which two countries choose their enforcement levels non- cooperatively, in order to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. We assume that crime is mobile, both ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and that criminals who hide abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited back. We show that, when extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement compared to the cooperative outcome: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. By contrast, when extradition is sufficiently costly, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country in which they have perpetrated a crime. Surprisingly, the fear of extraditing criminals enables countries to coordinate on the e¢ cient (cooperative) outcome.

Keywords: Crime; Enforcement; Extradition; Fleeing; Migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mig and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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http://www.csef.it/WP/wp504.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2019)
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2019)
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:504

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