Fighting Mobile Crime

Crinò, Rosario, Giovanni Immordino and Salvatore Piccolo ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rosario Crino ()

No 13424, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.

Keywords: Crime; Enforcement; Extradition; Fleeing; Migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mig and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13424 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2019)
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2018)
Working Paper: Fighting Mobile Crime (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13424

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13424

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().