Alfred Marshall's Cardinal Theory of Value: The Strong Law of Demand
Donald J. Brown () and
Caterina Calsamiglia
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Donald J. Brown: Department of Economics, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/emeritus/donald-j-brown
No 1615R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Abstract:
We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall's cardinal theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law of Demand. That is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, and global stability of equilibrium prices with respect to tatonnement price adjustment follow from the cyclical monotonicity of the market demand function in the Marshallian general equilibrium model.
Keywords: Cardinal utility; Quasilinear utility; Cyclical monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B13 D11 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2007-07, Revised 2013-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Alfred Marshall’s cardinal theory of value: the strong law of demand (2014) 
Working Paper: Alfred Marshall's Cardinal Theory of Value: The Strong Law of Demand (2013) 
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