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Selling Information

Johannes Hörner and Andrzej Skrzypacz

No 1743, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and why the seller can appropriate a substantial fraction of the value through gradual revelation, and how the entire value can be extracted with the help of a mediator.

Keywords: Value of information; Dynamic game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2010-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Selling Information (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Selling Information (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Selling Information (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Selling Information (2011) Downloads
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