Selling Information

Johannes Hörner and Andrzej Skrzypacz

No 1743R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We characterize optimal selling protocols/equilibria of a game in which an Agent first puts hidden effort to acquire information and then transacts with a Firm that uses this information to take a decision. We determine the equilibrium payoffs that maximize incentives to acquire information. Our analysis is similar to finding ex ante optimal self-enforcing contracts since information sharing, outcomes and transfers cannot be contracted upon. We show when and how selling and transmitting information gradually helps. We also show how mixing/side bets increases the Agent’s payoff. In fact, she can get the entire surplus with rich enough tests.

Keywords: Value of information; Dynamic game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2011-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d17/d1743-r.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Selling Information (2016)
Working Paper: Selling Information (2013)
Working Paper: Selling Information (2012)
Working Paper: Selling Information (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1743r

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().