Introduction to Judgment Aggregation

Christian List and Ben Polak ()
Additional contact information
Ben Polak: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/benjamin-polak

No 1753, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment ag­gregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propo­sitions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this intro­duction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impos­sibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous impossibilities, as discussed in the symposium. We then consider each of four possible escape-routes explored in the symposium.

Keywords: Judgment aggregation; Arrow's theorem; Escape routes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2010-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm and nep-hpe
Note: CFP 1297
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (March 2010), 145(2): 441-466

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Journal Article: Introduction to judgment aggregation (2010)
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Working Paper: Introduction to judgment aggregation (2010)
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