Promises and Expectations

Florian Ederer and Alexander Stremitzer
Additional contact information
Alexander Stremitzer: UCLA School of Law

No 1931R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors� expectations about promisees� expectations) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide evidence that a promisor�s aversion to disappointing a promisee�s expectation leads her to behave more generously. We propose and estimate a simple model of conditional guilt aversion that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases.

Keywords: Promises; Expectations; Beliefs; Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 D03 D64 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2013-12, Revised 2017-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (November 2017)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1931-r.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Promises and expectations (2017)
Working Paper: Promises and Expectations (2016)
Working Paper: Promises and Expectations (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1931r

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().