Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection

Florian Ederer and Weicheng Min
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Weicheng Min: Yale Department of Economics, https://economics.yale.edu/

No 2272, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by the lie detection technology because the Sender simply compensates by lying more. When the lie detection probability is sufficiently high, the Sender's (Receiver's) equilibrium payoff decreases (increases) with the lie detection probability.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Lying; Communication; Lie detection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection (2022)
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