Corruption and Cheating: Evidence from Rural Thailand
Olaf Hübler (),
Lukas Menkhoff and
No 1917, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
This study tests the prediction that perceived corruption reduces ethical behavior. Integrating a standard “cheating” experiment into a broad household survey in rural Thailand, we find clear support for this prediction: respondents who perceive corruption in state affairs are more likely to cheat and, thus, to fortify the negative consequences of corruption. Interestingly, there is a small group of non-conformers. The main relation is robust to consideration of socio-demographic, attitudinal, and situational control variables. Attendance of others at the cheating experiment, stimulating the reputational concern to be seen as honest, reduces cheating, thus indicating transparency as a remedy.
Keywords: Corruption; cheating; individual characteristics; lab-in-the-field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 D73 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 p.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp and nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1917
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