Corruption and Cheating: Evidence from Rural Thailand

Olaf Hübler, Melanie Koch, Lukas Menkhoff and Ulrich Schmidt

No 1917, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: This study tests the prediction that perceived corruption reduces ethical behavior. Integrating a standard “cheating” experiment into a broad household survey in rural Thailand, we find clear support for this prediction: respondents who perceive corruption in state affairs are more likely to cheat and, thus, to fortify the negative consequences of corruption. Interestingly, there is a small group of non-conformers. The main relation is robust to consideration of socio-demographic, attitudinal, and situational control variables. Attendance of others at the cheating experiment, stimulating the reputational concern to be seen as honest, reduces cheating, thus indicating transparency as a remedy.

Keywords: Corruption; cheating; individual characteristics; lab-in-the-field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D91 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 p.
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp and nep-sea
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Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption and cheating: Evidence from rural Thailand (2021)
Journal Article: Corruption and cheating: Evidence from rural Thailand (2021)
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