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Corruption and cheating: Evidence from rural Thailand

Olaf Hübler, Melanie Koch, Lukas Menkhoff and Ulrich Schmidt

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2021, vol. 145, 1-43

Abstract: This study tests the prediction that perceived corruption reduces ethical behavior. Integrating a standard "cheating" experiment into a broad household survey in rural Thailand, we find tentative support for this prediction: respondents who perceive corruption in state affairs are more likely to cheat and, thus, to fortify the negative consequences of corruption. Interestingly, there is a small group of non-conformers. The main relation is robust to consideration of socio-demographic, attitudinal, and situational control variables. Attendance of others at the cheating experiment, stimulating the reputational concern to be seen as honest, reduces cheating, thus indicating transparency as a remedy.

Keywords: Corruption; Cheating; Individual characteristics; Lab-in-the-field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D91 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/272050/1/H ... heating-Evidence.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption and cheating: Evidence from rural Thailand (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Corruption and Cheating: Evidence from Rural Thailand (2020) Downloads
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