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Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior

SeEun Jung () and Radu Vranceanu ()

No WP1513, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper reports results from a real-e ort experiment in which men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a real-eff ort task. Each participant receives an equal share of the team's output. Workers who perform better than their partner can punish him/her by imposing a fi ne. We manipulate the teams' gender composition (man-man, man-woman, and woman-woman) to analyze whether an individual's performance and sanctioning behavior depends on his/her gender and the gender interaction within the team. The data show that, on average, men perform slightly better than women. A man's performance will deteriorate when paired with a woman, while a woman's performance will improve when paired with a woman. When underperforming, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; if sanctioned, men tend to improve their performance, while women's performance does not change.

Keywords: Gender studies; Real-effort task; Team production; Performance; Punishment; Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

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https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01171161/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior (2015) Downloads
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