Quitting games - an example

Nicolas Vieille () and Eilon Solan ()

No 747, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: Quitting games are I-player sequential games in which, at any stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; player i then receives a payoff , which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero.

Keywords: stopping games; equilibrium; stochastic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2001-10-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Quitting games – An example (2003)
Working Paper: Quitting games - An example (2002)
Working Paper: Quitting Games - An Example (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0747

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