Quitting games – An example

Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

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Abstract: Quitting games are multi-player sequential games in which, at every stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; each player i then receives a payoff r S i, which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero.¶ We exhibit a four-player quitting game, where the "simplest" equilibrium is periodic with period two. We argue that this implies that all known methods to prove existence of an equilibrium payoff in multi-player stochastic games are therefore bound to fail in general, and provide some geometric intuition for this phenomenon.

Keywords: cyclic equilibrium; stochastic games; games of timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-01
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, Vol.31,n°3, pp.365-381. ⟨10.1007/s001820200125⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Quitting games - An example (2002)
Working Paper: Quitting games - an example (2001)
Working Paper: Quitting Games - An Example (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464962

DOI: 10.1007/s001820200125

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