Quitting games - An example

Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Quitting games are I-player sequential games in which, at any stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; player i then receives a payoff, which depends on the set of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero. We study a four-player game, where the simplest equilibrium profile is cyclic with period two. We also use geometrical arguments to show why techniques that work for 3-player games cannot be applied in general.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Quitting games; Equilibrium; Jeux d'arrêt; Jeux stochastiques; Equilibre (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242995v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Quitting games – An example (2003)
Working Paper: Quitting games - an example (2001)
Working Paper: Quitting Games - An Example (2001)
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