Continuous-Time Games of Timing

Nicolas Vieille (), Rida Laraki and Eilon Solan ()

No 773, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Keywords: Timing games; war of attrition; preemption games; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2003-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Continuous-time games of timing (2005)
Working Paper: Continuous-time games of timing (2005)
Working Paper: Continuous-Time Games of Timing (2003)
Working Paper: Continuous-time Games of Timing (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0773

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