Continuous-time games of timing

Nicolas Vieille (), Eilon Solan () and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect var epsilon-equilibrium, for each var epsilon>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Keywords: Timing games; Continuous-time games; Games of timing; War of attrition; Preemption games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, Vol.120,n°2, pp.206-238. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Continuous-time games of timing (2005)
Working Paper: Continuous-Time Games of Timing (2003)
Working Paper: Continuous-Time Games of Timing (2003)
Working Paper: Continuous-time Games of Timing (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464672

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001

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