Continuous-Time Games of Timing

Rida Laraki (), Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()
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Rida Laraki: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Keywords: Timing games; Continuous-time games; Games of timing; War of attrition; Preemption games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-03
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Published in 2003

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Related works:
Journal Article: Continuous-time games of timing (2005)
Working Paper: Continuous-time games of timing (2005)
Working Paper: Continuous-Time Games of Timing (2003)
Working Paper: Continuous-time Games of Timing (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00591682

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