Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner
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Mukul Majumdar: Cornell University

Working Papers from Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics

Abstract: This note reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient," and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats' bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.

Date: 2008-12
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https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/08-11.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2007)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:corcae:08-11

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